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I. -INTRODUCTION
Insolvency threatens the nation's thrift institutions:' the number of
troubled federal savings and loan institutions more than tripled in the first
half of 1981.2 These institutions' low-earning, long-term mortgage loans have
not provided income sufficient to pay the high interest rates required for
short-term loans of operating funds. To alleviate this financial strain, lenders
have vigorously sought enforcement of due-on-sale clauses when borrowers
transfer property securing old mortgage loans. A lender may use the clause
either to declare the entire debt due or to force a purchaser who wishes to
assume the loan to agree to an interest rate at or near the current rate. The
use of due-on-sale clauses, federal approval of them, and state attempts to
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, University of Georgia. B.S., 1961,
Louisiana State University; M.B.A., 1966, Louisiana State University; J.D., 1971,
Loyola University (New Orleans).
** 1982-1984Jervey Fellow, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., 1979,
Oglethorpe University; J.D., 1982, University of Georgia.
1. "Thrift institutions" as used in this Article means federal savings and loan
associations and savings banks chartered pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
2. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 20, 1981, at 2, col. 3.
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limit their enforcement increased in the 1970s, with a resultant increase in
litigation and legal commentary. 3
Courts in many recent decisions have abandoned discussion of the vir-
tues and vices of due-on-sale clauses as interest escalators. The debate has
shifted to federal pre-emption of state restrictions on the enforcement of due-
on-sale clauses by federal savings and loan associations. This litigation can
arise in several procedural forms and has caused a related debate over the
proper jurisdiction for assertion of the pre-emption defense. A number of
courts have avoided discussing pre-emption on the merits by deciding cases
on jurisdictional grounds.4 These recent decisions have returned the issue
of pre-emption to the state courts. In most states that restrict enforcement
of due-on-sale clauses, a predictable result occurs: state courts find no federal
pre-emption of state restrictions.
5
The avoidance of this controversial issue by the federal courts increases
the likelihood of congressional or Supreme Court resolution of the
uncertainty. 6 This Article, after briefly discussing the foundations necessary
for understanding the pre-emption controversy, addresses jurisdiction to
3. For partial bibliographies, see Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco
Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 482-85, 293 N.W. 2d 843, 850-51 (1980); Dunn, Selected
Current Legal Issues in Mortgage Financing, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.J. 812, 838
(1978); Kratovil, New Dilemma for Thrift Institutions: Judicial Emasculation of the Due-
On-Sale Clause, 12J. MAR.J. PRAC. &PROC. 299,301 n.6 (1979). Seealso Blocher,
Due-on-Sale in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 31 OATH. U.L. REV. 49 (1981);
Dunlavey, Wellenkamp's Wake: California Courts Divide on the Continued Enforceability
of Due-on-Sale Clauses, 3 WHITTIER L. REV. 517 (1981); Dunn & Nowinski, En-
forceability of Due-on-Transfer Clauses: An Update, 16 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
291 (1981); Guerin, Selected Problems in Wrap-Around Financing: Suggested Approaches
to Due-on-Sale Clauses and Purchaser's Depreciable Basis, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 401
(1981); Henkel & Seizer, Acceleration Clauses in Mortgages: Misuse During Periods of Tight
Money, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 441 (1980); Henkel & Selzer, UsingDue-on-Sale Clauses to
Increase Mortgage Rates, REAL ESTATE REV., Fall 1979, at 84; Note, Due-on-Sale
Clauses: A SuggestedApproachfor Dealing with Non-institutional Lenders, 8 W. ST. U.L.
REV. 57 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Nalore v. San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 663 F.2d 841 (9th
Cir. 1981) (federal question removal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3765
(U.S. Mar. 22, 1982); Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein ("Con-
ference II"), 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, No. 79-4818 (9th Cir. Sept.
23, 1981) (ripeness); Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 481 F. Supp. 616
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, No. 79-3573 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1981) (same), petition for
cert. filed, No. 81-1192 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1981).
5. See, e.g., ddlaCuestav. Fidelity Fed. Say. &LoanAss'n, 121 Cal. App.
3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), probable jurisdiction noted, No. 81-750 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1982); Panko v. Pan Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 174
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-922 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981); Holiday
Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981).
6. See note 174 infra.
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DUE-ON-SALE PRE-EMPTION
decide pre-emption cases and the substantive bases of pre-emption. The Ar-
ticle concludes that the federal courts generally do not have jurisdiction over
the pre-emption cases and that most findings of pre-emption are substan-
tively erroneous.
A. Due-on-Sale Clauses: A State Law Primer
A due-on-sale or due-on-encumbrance clause permits the lender to
declare the entire balance of the debt due and payable on the sale or further
encumbrance of the secured property without the prior consent of the lender.
The clause technically may be triggered when the buyer and seller enter into
an executory contract for a cash sale because the doctrine of equitable con-
version makes the buyer the equitable owner of the land on execution of the
contract. 7 The due-on-sale clause, however, is aimed at transactions such
as loan assumptions and purchases "subject to" existing mortgages.8
The original justification for the due-on-sale clause was simple and prac-
tical: a lender who had made a loan to one creditworthy individual could
use the threat of acceleration to insure that the purchaser also would be
creditworthy. 9 This use of the clause is still legitimate, even for the purpose
of exacting escalated interest. If the substitution of the purchaser for the mort-
gagor would jeopardize the security, acceleration is justified, either to defeat
the sale or to force a higher interest rate to compensate for the increased risk.
Recently, however, lenders have accelerated or threatened to accelerate
assumed debts to increase their portfolio yield. Although full repayment
would allow lenders to reinvest the money at prevailing rates, lenders more
often use the threat of acceleration to exact a higher interest rate from the
purchasers in exchange for waiver of the right to accelerate. This enables
lenders to bring long-term investment portfolios up to current rates without
the delays and costs of acceleration and foreclosure. 10
Lenders maintain that they have been able to offer reasonable rates over
terms as long as thirty years only because the average homeowner does not
remain in one residence the full term of the mortgage. In 1980, the Federal
National Mortgage Association (the "FNMA") purchased thirty-year mort-
gages in the secondary market at discounted purchase prices based on pro-
jected payoff within twelve years.'1 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(the "Board") expects that half of the conventional mortgages made in a
7. Kratovil, supra note 3, at 308.
8. For an explanation of the difference between an assumption and a pur-
chase "subject to" the existing mortgage, see G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 5.3-.4 (1979).
9. Note, Due-on-Sale Clauses in Deeds of Trust: State Regulation or Pre-emption?,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 367, 367-69.
10. Note,Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Casefor Adopting Stan-
dards of Reasonableness and Unconscionabilihy, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1975).
11. Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, -, 423 N.E.
2d 988, 1001 (1981).
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given year will be repaid well within ten years. 12 Accordingly, lenders ad-
just interest rates to cover projected inflation only for about one-third of the
stated term. Thus, people who pay off their mortgages early and enter new
mortgages at the current rate subsidize loans to people who do not pay off
early. Loan assumptions deprive lenders of the early payoffs needed to sub-
sidize low-profit and no-profit loans. Allowing the exercise of due-on-sale
clauses as interest escalators locks lenders into fixed rates only for relatively
short periods, thus minimizing losses during periods of inflation and dis-
intermediation.
Courts sympathetic to lenders approve this money market rationale or
portfolio maintenance justification, explaining that nonexercise of due-on-
sale clauses would increase average interest rates for all home buyers.' 3 One
court has characterized those wishing to assume loans at old interest rates
as "simply too eager to shift to others burdens properly belonging on their
own shoulders." 4
Courts hostile to the money market rationale also advance various
justifications. These courts presumptively favor the borrower and require
the lender to justify the interest escalation. ' 5 The mere desire to increase
the interest, unaccompanied by proof of security impairment resulting from
the transfer, is insufficient to overcome the presumption favoring the bor-
rower. Proving security impairment is difficult for most lenders.
Courts favoring the borrower justify the presumption with two principal
rationales. First, they argue that interest escalation is an unreasonable and,
therefore, unlawful restraint on alienation because the seller must lower his
price to entice the purchaser to accept the lender's demands.1 6 This approach
confuses market factors with classical restraints on alienation analysis. 17 Any
increase in costs, whether from high interest rates or increased sales prices,
discourages purchasers.
The second justification advanced by courts favoring borrowers is based
12. Schott Advisory Op., Res. No. 75-647, at 22 (F.H.L.B.B.July 30, 1975).
13. See Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, -, 423
N.E.2d 998, 1601-02 (1981).
14. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 916 (4th Cir.
1981).
15. Bartke, Michigan's Looking Glass World of Due-on-Sale Clauses, 24 WAYNE
U.L. REV. 971, 989-90(1978); Dunn, supranote3, at 824-35. ButseeFirstFed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n of Rapid City v. Kelly, 312 N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1981).
16. Wisconsin Ave. Assocs., Inc. v. 2720 Wis. Ave. Cooperative Ass'n, Nos.
79-631, 79-1102, 79-1103 (D.C. Feb. 2, 1982); Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n., 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. 3d 695, -P.2d - , - Cal. Rptr. - (1982); Wellenkamp v. Bank
of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). Contra, Lipps
v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Jan. 22, 1982).
17. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 471,
293 N.W. 2d 843, 845 (1980).
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on equitable principles. These courts correctly state that foreclosure histori-
cally has been a creature of equity courts and that one seeking foreclosure
is subject to equitable defenses. 18 This approach sometimes proves too much,
however. When the due-on-sale clause does not explain that interest escala-
tion might be a condition for waiver of the right of acceleration, a borrower
might reasonably believe that the clause's sole purpose was prevention of
security impairment. Equitable relief in the form of a disallowance of in-
terest escalation is appropriate in such a case 19 and is more intellectually
honest than the unreasonable restraints approach. To suggest, however, that
the money market rationale is inherently inequitable, even when the clause
fully and fairly informs the borrower of the possibility of interest escalation,
stretches credulity, 20 and gives the same inflexible rule as the unreasonable
restraints approach.
B. The Federal Role in Residential Financing
The Federal Home Loan Bank System was created by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act of 1932.21 Modeled after the Federal Reserve System,. the
system serves as a central credit facility and regulatory body for member
associations. 22 The supervisor of the system is the three-member Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, an independent government agency that charters
and regulates federal associations and governs the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (the "FSLIC") and the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation (the "FHLMC' 1).23 All federal associations are members
of the system and must be insured by the FSLIC. The FHLMC is a private
18. See Clearwater Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Knight, 396 So. 2d 1238 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Both cases were rejected by the court in First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981). But see First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Winter Haven v. Siegel, 529 F. Supp. 562 (M.D. Fla. 1982)
(controversy was not over federal law, but over state's authority to deny enforce-
ment in exercise of equitable jurisdiction).
19. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D.
Fla. 1981); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 633-34, 224 S.E.2d 580,
589 (1976) (Lake, J., dissenting); Great N. Sav. Co. v. Ingarra, 66 Ohio St. 2d
503, 423 N.E.2d 128 (1981); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison,
87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976). But see In re Bonder, No. 811 1SC332 (N.C.
App. Jan. 5, 1982).
20. Clearwater Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Knight, 396 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1976).
22. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES 73
(1974).
23. Comment, A Casefor Preemption, Wellenkamp v. Bank ofAmerica is Inapplicable
to Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219, 223 (1980).
1982]
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corporation controlled by the Board. The FHLMC is the central credit facility
and a secondary purchaser of conventional mortgages and should be
distinguished from the Federal National Mortgage Association (the
"FNMA"), another secondary purchaser of mortgages. Created by the
Federal Housing Administration in 1938,24 the FNMA primarily purchases
government insured or guaranteed mortgages. Since 1968, the FNMA has
been a nongovernmental corporation.25 The FHLMC and the FNMA are
the principal secondary purchasers of home mortgages in this country. Both
have developed uniform lending instruments that, with special nonuniform
convenants, are used in every state.
Congress authorized the creation of the Board in 1932 in response to
a crisis in home financing, 26 but this legislation did not cure the crisis. 2 7 In
1933, President Roosevelt requested more help from Congress to relieve
homeowners from some of the burden of excessive accrued interest and prin-
cipal payments and to protect borrowers from foreclosure. 2 The financing
crisis probably resulted, in part, from ill-advised state practices in home
financing. The states had created a hodgepodge of savings and loan regula-
tions, and Congress hoped that the Board, infused with new powers under
the Home Owners' Loan Act of 193329 (the "HOLA"), would create rules
setting an example for sound and uniform practices.30 The HOLA created
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (the "HOLC"), which was author-
ized to exchange its bonds for mortgages held by various lenders, including
state savings and loan associations. The only mortgages eligible for HOLC
exchange were those with equal monthly payments. Loans featuring.balloon
payments, rollover of principal at specified intervals, and repayment by sink-
ing funds were considered pernicious and were not eligible for exchange,
in spite of their widespread use by state associations.3 1
Pursuant to authority granted by the HOLA, 32 the Board has pro-
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a) (1976).
25. HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, supra note 22, at 75.
26. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 908 (C.D.
Cal. 1978), rev'd, No. 79-3573 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1981), petitionfor cert. filed, No.
81-1192 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1981).
27. T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 23-24(1969).
28. Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein ("Conference I"), 604
F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
29. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1470 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
30. T. MARVELL, supra note 27, at 23-24.
31. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. at 908-09.
32. In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people
may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes,
the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may
prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination,
operation, and regulation of associations to be known as 'Federal Savings
and Loan Associations', and to issue charters therefor, giving primary con-
[Vol. 47
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mulgated a myriad of regulations that some courts consider so comprehen-
sive that they cover all aspects of every federal savings and loan association
"from its cradle to its corporate grave. "3 Such statements paint with too
broad a brush because purely local aspects are not federally regulated. The
generalization is, however, quite close to the mark with respect to purely
internal operations of federal associations.
Four regulations concerning due-on-sale clauses fuel the current litiga-
tion over whether federal authorization of due-on-sale clauses pre-empts state
enforcement of state restrictions of the clauses. Section 545.8-3(a) of Tite
12 of the Code of Federal Regulations3 4 requires that loan instruments pro-
vide "full protection" to the association. Sections 545.8-3(o and (g)35
specifically allow the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause according to the
terms of the loan contract, with certain limitations. Section 556.9(a)-(d)16
clarifies the Board's position regarding late charges, prepayment penalties
assessed in conjunction with due-on-sale clauses, exercise of the clause as
an interest escalator, and the waiver of the right of acceleration. In section
556.9(f),3 7 the Board re-affirmed its entire policy.
Lenders in states that restrict enforcement of due-on-sale clauses have
several alternatives. First, they can use new alternative mortgage instruments
that vary the yield with the cost of the debt. Second, they can shorten the
terms of loans by exercising due-on-sale clauses when possible. Third, they
can refuse to purchase instruments with nonexercisable due-on-sale clauses
and include call or renegotiation clauses in all new instruments. Fourth,
lenders can seek relief in Congress.38
Fighting economic storms paralleled only by the depression of the 1930s
and armed with federal regulations, federal associations hoped to avoid the
application of state restrictions on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses
by asserting a pre-emption defense. Just as the associations began to obtain
favorable judgments, a concomitant issue arose: which courts have jurisdic-
tion over these pre-emption cases?
II. JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PRE-EMPTION CASES
The requisites of federal subject matter jurisdiction are found in Title
sideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-fimancing
institutions in the United States.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976).
33. People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal.1951).
34. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(a) (1981).
35. Id. § 545.8-3(f) to (g).
36. Id. 5 556.9(a)-(d).
37. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,124 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. 5 556.9(0).
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28, chapter 13, of the United States Code. Federal courts do not have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over federal associations solely by virtue of their
federal charters. A district court has jurisdiction over a corporation based
on incorporation by Congress only if the United States owns more than one-
half the corporation's capital stock.3 9 If a federal association cannot meet
this test, two other bases of jurisdiction might apply. Diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties40 is the most easily met basis of federal subject matter
jurisdiction over a due-on-sale clause controversy.41 The second basis of
federal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises under federal law42
or under an act of Congress regulating commerce. 4
3
Three caveats are in order concerning the satisfaction of the federal ques-
tion basis. First, the same federal question provisions apply to both original
and removal jurisdiction. 44 There is an appealing surface symmetry in ap-
plying the same tests to each, but the pre-emption litigation illustrates that
this leads to bizarre results in federal question cases. 45 Second, cases that
decide the meaning of "arising under" for purposes of the "arising under
federal law" basis may be relied on in cases dealing with the "arising under
an act of Congress regulating commerce" basis, and vice versa. 46 Third,
the cases discussing the meaning of "arising under" are numerous, but no
litmus test has emerged.4
7
ChiefJustice Marshall, in one of the earliest Supreme Court cases that
discussed federal subject matter jurisdiction, said that Congress constitu-
tionally could extend federal question jurisdiction to any case involving
federal law, whether substantially or tangentially, whether raised in the com-
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1976).
40. Id. § 1332.
41. For a due-on-sale clause case in which the court questioned the diversity
of a limited partnership, see Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n,
657 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 1981).
42. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. III 1979).
44. Id. § 1441(a) (1976).
"45. The defendant can remove a case from a state court if the plaintiff relied
on federal law, but neither can get into federal court when the defendant sets up
a federal defense to the plaintiffs nonfederal claim, see pp. 234-36 infra.
46. See, e.g., Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U.S. 350 (1942) (per
curiam); Maritime Serv. Corp. v. Sweet Brokerage de Puerto Rico, Inc., 537 F.2d
560 (1st Cir. 1976); Yancoskie v. Delaware River Port Auth., 528 F.2d 722 (3d
Cir. 1975).
47. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS §§17-18 (1976);
32 AM. JUR. 2D, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 47-77 (1967). The requirements of
the pleading in federal question case, however, are well-established. The plain-
tiff's statement of his cause of action must show that it is based on federal law and
be self-supporting, unaided by allegations in anticipation or avoidance of possible
defenses. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1908).
[Vol. 47
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plaint or in the answer.4 8 Congress has not been so expansive in consider-
ing federal question jurisdiction. For example, Congress in 1971 rejected
a proposal that would have allowed removal from a state court when a
"substantial defense" under federal law was asserted. 49 Congress' only re-
cent major extension of federal question jurisdiction was elimination of the
minimum amount in controversy requirement.5 0 The Supreme Court also
has been restrained in the extension ofjurisdiction.5 1 In 1916, Justice Holmes
first tried to give meaning to "arising under" with these words: "A suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action. '52 Twenty years later, Justice
Cardozo observed that a case is within federal question jurisdiction if
a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States ... [is] an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff 's
cause of action.... The right or immunity must be such that it will
be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given
one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another....
A genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible or con-
jectural one, must exist with reference thereto... , and the con-
troversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaidedt
by the answer or by the petition for removal.... Indeed, the com-
plaint itself will not avail as a basis ofjurisdiction in so far as it goes
beyond a statement of the plaintiff 's cause of action and anticipates
or replies to a probable defense.5 3
The problem with many of the due-on-sale clause pre-emption cases is that
a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States
is not an element, let alone an essential element, of the plaintiff 's cause of
action.
Typical state litigation can take two forms. The-lender might foreclose
on the property. The borrower would raise a defense of state restrictions on
the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause, and the lender would counter with
the pre-emption argument.5 4 Alternatively, the borrower or his purchaser
facing the threat of foreclosure might sue in a state court for declaratory or
injunctive relief based on the state restrictions, and the lender would raise
48. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
49. See 117 Cong. Rec. 15,089 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Burdick).
50. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
51. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964) (Court has
"long given a narrower meaning to the 'arising under' language" than Osborn
suggested).
52. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916).
53. Gullyv. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936)(citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., Panko v. Pan Am. Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 1&9 Cal. App. 3d
916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-922 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1981);
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the pre-emption defense. 55 The borrower or his purchaser can establish his
prima facie case fairly easily. He need show only that the loan instrument
contained a due-on-sale clause, that the borrower attempted to transfer the
property, and that the lender invoked or threatened to invoke the clause.
State restrictions force the lender to prove that the transfer would impair
his security or that acceleration otherwise would not be inequitable or an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. The state courts have not been recep-
tive to lenders' pre-emption arguments. If a state court rejects the argument,
the lender's only avenue of appeal is through the state court system, with
final appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
Federal question jurisdiction exists in neither of the two forms of litiga-
tion discussed above, because neither satisfies the Holmes creation test or
the Cardozo essential element test for the "arising under" standard. The
claim for relief is based on state foreclosure law or state due-on-sale clause
restrictions. Federal pre-emption is interjected only as a defense, in anticipa-
tion or avoidance of arguments based on state law. 56 A stronger case for
federal question jurisdiction would exist if the complaint directly challenged
the constitutionality of the HOLA.57 Cases to the contrary ignore58 or assume
away the issue. 59
Typical federal litigation also may take two forms. The lender may seek
declaratory relief in a federal district court. Alternatively, the lender, as defen-
dant in a state suit, may seek removal to a federal court.
In the first form, the lender alleges that the action arises under the HOLA
and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. The lender asks
the federal court to declare that federal regulations pre-empt state laws and
exclusively govern the validity and exercise of the due-on-sale clause. Because
the DeclaratoryJudgment Act 60 expands only the remedies available in, and
not the jurisdiction of, the federal courts, 61 the court must find an indepen-
dent source of jurisdiction. 62
55. See, e.g., de la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App.
3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), probable jurisdiction noted, No. 81-750 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1982); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d
471 (Minn. 1981).
56. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
57. SeeSmartv. First Fed. Say. &LoanAss'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147, 1161-62
(E.D. Mich. 1980).
58. Lindenberg v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 80-983A (N.D. Ga. Dec.
8, 1981).
59. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 912 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1981). See also Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d
29, 34-35 (3d Cij. 1981) (criticizes Williams).
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
61. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
62. For a case in which the court erroneously based its jurisdiction on the
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In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ,63 a case concerning the validity
of certain contracts for the purchase of natural gas, the Supreme Court said
that if the declaratory plaintiff had sued for specific performance or damages,
the case would have been decided under state law. By seeking a declaratory
judgment, the plaintiff only injected federal law in anticipation of a defense. 64
Thus, no federal question jurisdiction existed. The same conclusion was
reached above in the discussion of borrower suits for declaratory relief,65
and the same is true in lender suits in federal court for declaratory relief. 66
The lender injects federal law only in anticipation of the borrower's defense
of state restrictions on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. 67
In Twin City Federal Savings &Loan Association v. Gelhar,68 the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota concluded that pre-emption is
always defensive, even if asserted in the plaintiff 's complaint, and thus can-
not support federal question jurisdiction. 9 The court also stated that even
if it had jurisdiction, pre-emption suits by lenders were not appropriate cases
for exercise of the court's discretion to grant declaratory relief.70 A declaratory
DeclaratoryJudgment Act, see First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F.
Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
63. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
64. Id. at 672.
65. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
66. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Horn, No. CV 76-238-WMB
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1979).
67. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974)
(per curiam) (footnote omitted). Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.
237 (1952), is a case often misconstrued in pre-emption cases. Wycoff sought to
avoid state regulation of its transportation business by seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that Congress had pre-empted state regulation of the field. The Supreme Court
found no case or controversy and suggested in dictum that even if the case were
ripe, no federal question jurisdiction existed. "Federal courts will not seize litiga-
tions from state courts merely because one, normally a defendant, goes to federal
court to begin his federal law defense before the state court begins the case under
state law." Id. at 248 (dictum) (footnote omitted). In Conference of Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'ns v. Stein ("Conference I"), 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'dmem.,
445 U.S. 921 (1980), a case involving state anti-redlining regulations, the court in-
correctly assumed from Wycoff that once a case or controversy is found in a pre-
emption case, federal question jurisdiction automatically follows. 604 F.2d at 1259.
Accord, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 423 n.8 (1st Cir.
1979) (dictum). This analysis confuses ripeness with "arising under" federal law.
See Smart v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
Indeed, the WycoffCourt recognized that the case or controversy inquiry is distinct
from the federal question requirement. 344 U.S. at 246 (dictum).
68. 525 F. Supp. 802 (D. Minn. 1981).
69. Id. at 804 (citing Home Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Insurance Dept., 571
F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978).
70. 525 F. Supp. at 804.
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judgment should be granted only when it would serve a useful purpose by
terminating the controversy in a manner that would clarify and settle legal
relations. 71 In these lender actions, a declaratory judgment would not ter-
minate the controversy but would only preface foreclosure under state law,
especially when the lender's complaint evinces an intention to foreclose and
essentially asks for a declaration of his right to prevail in the foreclosure ac-
tion. The court concluded:
[W]hile the availability of another remedy does not preclude
declaratory relief in appropriate cases, where that other remedy can
afford more effective relief, an action for declaratory relief should
not be entertained.... In this instance, direct, appropriate and com-
plete relief can be afforded in the state court foreclosure
proceedings. 72
The second form of federal litigation is removal by the defendant lender
of the borrower's or purchaser's state court action. Removal jurisdiction,
like that for declaratory judgments, is dependent on original federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 73 Thus, absent diversity of the parties, the federal
question issues discussed above apply. The defendant cannot create removal
jurisdiction by raising the federal question in his petition for removal because
the federal question must be disclosed in the complaint, unaided by the
answer or petition for removal. 74
In Bailey v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,75 the United States
District Court for the District of Illinois made an erroneous distinction be-
tween raising a federal defense in anticipation of a state claim and raising
federal pre-emption. The court explained:
This case is to be distinguished from one in which a federal ques-
tion is asserted as a defense, or by plaintiff in anticipation of a defense
.... When the complaint discloses, however, as it does here, a con-
troversy in an area in which federal law has pre-empted state law,
a federal question is necessarily implicit in the complaint.... Because
the regulation of federal savings and loan associations is such a pre-
empted area, the complaint necessarily presents a federal question
76
In another removal case, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan correctly responded to the Bailey distinction:
71. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952); Alsager
v. District Court, 518 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (8th Cir. 1975).
72. 525 F. Supp. at 804-05 (citations omitted). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently reversed, on other jurisdictional grounds,
two cases factually similar to Twin City in which the lower courts found pre-emption.
See cases cited note 4 supra.
73. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
74. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
75. 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
76. Id. at 1141-42 (citations omitted).
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The difficulty with these cases is that they make an irrelevant distinc-
tion between the ordinary federal question defense ... and the federal
preemption defense .... Under the first situation there would be
no removal jurisdiction but under the second there would be removal
jurisdiction according to these cases. The court can see no rationale
for making this distinction and it declines to do So.77
In Trent Realty Associates v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,78 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the correct
reasoning. The purchaser had sued in a NewJersey state court for declaratory
and monetary relief after he had agreed to pay off the principal and to pay
into escrow a demanded interest penalty. The lender removed the suit to
the federal district court, claiming diversity and federal question jurisdic-
tion. The district court refused to remand the case to the state court. The
court of appeals found no federal question jurisdiction and seriously doubted
the diversity claim, which was remanded to the district court for further in-
quiry. The lender maintained that federal question jurisdiction existed
because the plaintiff's state court complaint raised substantial issues of
federal law: it concerned the activities of a federal association governed by
the HOLA and regulated by the Board pursuant to the HOLA. The lender
argued that the complaint implicitly challenged the federal right to impose
an acceleration charge. 79 Admitting that no clear test for "arising under
federal law" exists, the court of appeals concluded that the most widely
followed test was a summarization by Professor Mishkin: for original federal
question jurisdiction there must be a substantial claim founded directly on
federal law.80 This test differs little from the Cardozo essential element test.
The court restated that the federal question must appear on the face of the
complaint and cannot anticipate a state law claim because " '[n]ot every
question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the
basis of the suit.' "81 The traditional analytical framework applies to a
declaratoryjudgment action.82 To hold otherwise would allow artful pleading
to provide federal question jurisdiction in contravention of the whole trend
of Congress' jurisdictional legislation, would disregard the effective func-
tioning of the judicial system, and would distort the limited purpose of the
DeclaratoryJudgment Act.8 3 The court of appeals found that the plaintiff 's
77. Johnson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 418 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (E.D.
Mich. 1976).
78. 657 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 32.
80. Id.; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 157, 168 (1953).
81. 657 F.2d at 32-33 (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115
(1936)).
82. 657 F.2d at 33.
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complaint was based solely on state law. Thus, even assuming that federal
regulations did pre-empt state law, no federal question jurisdiction existed.8 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also dashed
lenders' hopes for a federal court of appeals' finding of pre-emption inNalore
v. San Diego Federal Savings & Loan Association.85 The Nalores purchased pro-
perty subject to a loan with a due-on-sale clause and refused the lender's
demand for a higher interest rate. The lender exercised the due-on-sale
clause. The Nalores sought declaratory and injunctive relief in a Califor-
nia state court and obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining
foreclosure. The lender removed the case to the federal district court, assert-
ing federal question jurisdiction and pre-emption. The district court denied
the plaintiff 's motion for remand, denied a request for injunctive relief,
found federal pre-emption, and granted summary judgment for the lender.
The court of appeals found Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan
Association,8 6 a case decided by the court two days earlier, dispositive. The
Nalore's complaint, like that in Guinasso to recover interest on escrow ac-
counts, relied solely on state law; the federal pre-emption argument was
merely a defense. 87 Under the Cardozo test, a substantial proposition of
federal law did not form" 'a direct and essential element of the plaintiff 's
cause of action.' "88 Federal question jurisdiction could not rest on proposi-
84. See also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936), in which
Justice Cardozo wrote:
The most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the
background, just as farther in the background there lurks a question of con-
stitutional law, the question of state power in our federal form of govern-
ment. A dispute so doubtful and conjectural, so far removed from plain
necessity, is unavailing to extinguish the jurisdiction of the states.
The Trent Realty Associates court also rejected, on the basis of Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), several cases suggesting that, "notwithstanding
plaintiff's failure to plead a federal question or base its action on a federal statute
or regulation, a federal court will have removal jurisdiction if federal laws are
necessarily brought into play." 657 F.2d at 35. Those rejected cases were Bailey
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979); First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & LoanAss'n, 446 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ala.
1978); and Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
85. 663 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denid, 50 U.S.L.W. 3765 (U.S. Mar.
22, 1982).
86. 656 F.2d 1364(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3765 (U.S. Mar.
22, 1982).
87. Nalore v. San Diego Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 663 F.2d at 842 (citing
Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d at 1367).
88. Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d at 1366
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tions merely anticipating a federal defense. 89
Nalore suggests a shift in the ninth circuit court of appeals' approach to
federal question cases. The court had held earlier in Meyers v. Beverly Hills
Federal Savings & Loan Association9" that federal law pre-empted California
restrictions on the enforcement of prepayment penalties. 91 As in Nalore and
Guinasso, the lender in Meyers had removed a state action to a federal court.
Unlike Nalore and Guinasso, the court in Meyers did not deal with the removal
jurisdiction issue. The lender in Guinasso suggested that Meyers implicitly
authorized removal of all cases in which a federal savings and loan associa-
tion asserts a pre-emption defense. Because jurisdiction was not discussed
in Meyers, the Guinasso court rejected the suggested implication.92
In summary, recent lower federal court decisions have not been favorable
to the federal associations.9 3 The ninth circuit court of appeals has reversed,
sub silentio, its former approach to federal question cases. The reasoning of
decisions holding that state courts are the proper forums has substantial
Supreme Court support. The principles of federalism are 'served well by these
decisions, as state courts can decide pre-emption questions and apply state
law if appropriate. This privilege of the state courts is not lightly abrogated
in favor of the district court. It also may be argued that if the federal courts
were to be the proper forums for the pre-emption arguments, the Constitu-
tion and jurisdiction statutes would have provided for exclusive federal
jurisdiction. Finally, the remand decisions are reviewable only through the
state court system, with final appeal to the Supreme Court. 94
III. SUBSTANTIVE BASES OF PRE-EMPTION
Pre-emption stems from the supremacy clause of the Federal
Constitution, 95 which declares that the Constitution and federal laws enacted
pursuant to it shall be the supreme law of the land. The federal system has
a central government of limited, albeit sometimes exclusive, powers. While
89. Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d at 1366 (cita-
tions omitted).
90. 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 1147.
92. Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d at 1366. The
lender also asserted that the court's earlier finding of federal question jurisdiction
in Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein ("Conference I"), 604 F.2d
1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'dmem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980), supported federal question
jurisdiction in Guinasso. The court improperly distinguished Conference I by noting
that in that case the court found a case or controversy, whereas the plaintiff in
Guinasso did not rely on federal law. See 656 F.2d at 1367 n. 10. The court confused
ripeness with the concept of "arising under" federal law. See note 67 supra.
93. But see Price v. Florida Fed. Say. &LoanAss'n, 524F. Supp. 175 (M.D.
Fla. 1981).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1976).
95. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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federal law sometimes occupies a field so completely that it excludes all state
participation, it usually builds on legal relationships already established by
the states, altering and supplanting them only as necessary for federal
purposes. 96 This concept acknowledges the federal government's humble
origins: the states ceded power to create a central government-the central
government did not create the states. When laws of the two sovereigns con-
flict, federal law controls if the contradiction is strong enough to trigger the
supremacy clause. The pre-emption inquiry is whether Congress' purpose
expressly or implicitly requires subordination of state policy.
Federal laws must be enacted pursuant to the federal government's con-
stitutional powers to have pre-emptive effect. Recent due-on-sale clause cases
dispute the constitutionality of the federal regulations because of disagree-
ment over what Congress could empower the Board to do, what Congress
actually empowered the Board to do, and what the Board purports to do.
Expansive interpretations of the general welfare clause, the necessary and
proper clause, and the commerce clause of the Constitution have permit-
ted Congress to govern many aspects of modem life. Although the Constitu-
tion does not specifically authorize Congress to charter and regulate finan-
cial institutions, Congress' power to do so has remained undisputed for the
more than 160 years since McCulloch v. Maryland.97 The Supreme Court in
McCulloch recognized the importance of allowing Congress implied powers
to implement express powers. This rationale justified Congress' creation
of a bank to aid federal fiscal operations. McCulloch has been used several
times to uphold the constitutionality of the HOLA. 98 Congress' establish-
ment of the federal savings and loan system and regulation of that system
by the Board have been justified under the general welfare clause. 99
The problem in the pre-emption cases is whether Congress expressly
or implicitly authorized the Board to displace state due-on-sale clause restric-
tions that are grounded in property, contract, and equityjurisprudence. Does
an agency with the power to grant federal charters and regulate the associa-
tions also have the power to abrogate entire areas of state law?
Certain principles apply to all pre-emption cases. State law governs the
acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property and defines the rights
96. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed.
1973).
97. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
98. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); United States v. Kay, 89
F.2d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1937); People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp.
311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
99. First Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Loomis, 97 F.2d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 666 (1939); Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
499 F.2d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 1974).
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of its owners relative to the state or to private parties. 100 "Even when federal
[common] law was in its heyday, an exception was carved out for local laws
of real property." 101 Likewise, commercial agreements generally are
governed by state law.102 When the states traditionally have governed the
field in question, the Supreme Court assumes that federal law will not
supersede the historic police powers of the states unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.10 3 This assures that the federal-state
balance will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily
by the courts. 0 4 The clear and manifest purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone because" [t]he exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be
presumed" and is not to be found on the basis of superficial analysis or im-
aginary conflicts.105 An express statement of pre-emption would meet this
requirement, but often Congress neglects to state clearly in its legislation
whether it intends to pre-empt state laws.
When Congress fails to express its intent, a clear and manifest purpose
still may be implied. 0 6 First, the scheme of federal regulation may be so per-
vasive that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress excluded the states com-
pletely. Second, an act might touch a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that
only federal law apply. Third, even if Congress has not completely foreclosed
state law in an area, state law is void to the extent it conflicts with a valid
federal law.
Recent decisions suggest that the courts will construe conflicts as nar-
rowly as possible, 0 7 illustrating the trend of the Burger Court to reconcile
the operation of state and federal provisions when possible. 108 Sound policy
reasons support the Court's narrow pre-emption principles. Congress can
change by legislation the result of an erroneous finding of no pre-emption,
but states cannot correct erroneous findings of pre-emption.
A. Express Pre-emption by Legislation and Regulation
Congress may have expressly pre-empted state restrictions of the exer-
100. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378-79
(1977).
101. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973).
102. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
103. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
104. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
105. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413
(1973).
106. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978) (The
Supreme Court is, however, "generally reluctant to infer pre-emption.").
107. Id.; First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 737 (N.D.
Fla. 1981).
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cise of due-on-sale clauses by passing the HOLA, which authorized the Board
to regulate the organization, incorporation, examination, and operation of
federal associations.109 One federal court has declared that the HOLA allows
the Board to govern the entire range of federal association activities because
the HOLA did not provide for sharing the Board's authority with state
agencies.'1 0 This statement may be correct regarding regulation of purely
internal operations of the associations, but it overstates Congress' delega-
tion of other powers to the Board. Merely because Congress gave the Board
plenary authority to regulate federally chartered associations does not mean
that, by virtue of a federal charter, a federal association need not abide by
the real property and mortgage laws of the state in which it does business.
Congress probably did not intend to give the Board the power to sus-
pend these substantive state laws. First, the HOLA's preamble states that
the legislative purpose was to respond to an economic emergency: to extend
relief to home owner-occupants who were unable to amortize their debts
elsewhere.I1 ' The HOLA states that it was passed to provide home financ-
ing and to create local mutual thrift institutions.1 2 It suggests nothing regard-
ing suspending substantive state law. Federal associations are not immune
from all state laws. Congress has specified areas in which substantive state
law governs federal associations. 113 The Board's power was to be similar to
that given the Comptroller of the Currency regarding national banks, which
generally is not pre-emptive regarding the enforceability of loan contracts.11
4
The first chairman of the Board told a House committee that the Board would
be cautious in authorizing federal associations to conduct activities not
authorized by state law. Federal associations would have no more authority
than state associations, and the Board would subject federal associations to
the same limitations applied to state associations. The chairman finally said
that the Board wanted the latitude to fit the regulations to state law." 5 A
109. 12 U.S.C. 9 1464(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
110. People v. Coast Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal.
1951).
111. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, Preamble, 48 Stat. 128 (1933).
112. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See 77 Cong. Rec. 2,480 (1933)
(remarks of Rep. Luce). At that time, one-half of all counties contained no savings
and loan associations, thrift institutions, or insurance companies. Id.
113. Federal associations are subject to state taxes not exceeding those assessed
state associations. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(h) (1976).
114. 77 Cong. Rec. 4,987 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Recently, however,
the power of the Comptroller of the Currency to regulate adjustable rate mortgage
practices of national banks, even though such regulations might displace inconsis-
tent state laws, including due-on-sale laws, was upheld. See Conference of State Bank
Supervisors v. Lord, Civil Action No. 81-1591 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1982).
115. Hearings on HOLA, S. 1317, Before a Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on Banking
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general counsel of the Board who helped draft the HOLA told a Senate com-
mittee that the bill was to protect homeowners, not investors.11 6 Pre-emption
would deprive homeowners of perceived state consumer protections.
Some attorneys have tried to use a 1978 branching amendment" 7 to the
HOLA as evidence of Congress' reaffirmation of its intent of pre-emption.
A colloquy between Senators Brooke and Proxmire suggested that the
Board's power is plenary over activities such as branching, antidiscrimina-
tion, and lending authority." 8 Attorneys for lenders and the Board used this
interchange in briefs as authority for the proposition that Congress reaffirmned
the intent to give the Board supremacy under the HOLA. Senator Prox-
mire publicly disapproved this use of his remarks as a misinterpretation of
their basis and intent." 9
The final argument for express pre-emption under the HOLA is based
on the "best practices" language of the HOLA. That provision allows the
Board, in chartering and regulating new associations, to give "primary con-
sideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home financing in-
stitutions in the United States." 20 One court interpreted this language to
mean that the Board can determine what the best practices are, regardless
of state practices, and implement these federally ordained practices nationally
on a uniform basis.' 2' This analysis assumes that the "best practices"
language grants exclusive governing powers, rather than merely providing
standards for the enactment of regulations. This assumption is invalid
because it conflicts with other bases of the Board's authority. For example,
the Board is authorized to examine state laws concerning conveyances, re-
cording of land titles, and enforcement of mortgage holders' rights. If the
Board finds that state law inadequately protects advances made by the Board
or by member or nonmember banks, the Board can limit or withhold opera-
tions in that state until the state laws is changed to the Board's satisfaction.' 2 2
The HOLA did not authorize the Board to pre-empt objectionable substan-
tive state laws governing mortgagees' rights.
In summary, the language and history of the HOLA only weakly sup-
port express pre-emption by Congress, whether by outright statement or
by delegation of power to the Board. If Congress did not intend pre-emption,
116. Id. (statement of Horace Russell, General Counsel FHLBB, Atlanta,
Georgia).
117. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
§ 1202, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
118. 124 Cong. Rec. 18,471-72 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Brooke & Sen.
Proxmire).
119. 125 Cong. Rec. 2,166 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
121. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp.
11, 17-18 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
122. 12 U.S.C. § 1428 (1976).
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the Board's regulations are invalid to the extent they purport to pre-empt
state law.
Even if the Board properly could pre-empt state law, problems exist in
the Board's attempt to provide for pre-emption of state laws through the
promulgation of regulations. Section 545.8-3123 contains no express language
of pre-emption. Pre-emption is mentioned only in a preamble to the regu-
lation. 124 Preambles do not have the force of law because they are not rules
affecting individual rights or obligations. 125 This introductory language was
not enacted pursuant to the procedural requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act 126 for the promulgation of regulations. 127
The Board contends that the language in section 54-5.8-3(a) 128 requir-
ing "full protection" to associations authorizes the use of due-on-sale
clauses. 129 Yet, the regulation mentions protections relating to recording,
insurance, taxes, government levies, maintenance, repairs, and assignments
of rent, without mentioning contract terms that displace state laws. Addi-
tionally, due-on-sale clauses are not of the same genus as those protections
listed. 13 0 The section does provide that loan contracts "shall comply with
applicable provisions of law." 131 Is the applicable law state law or state law
as pre-empted by federal law? One court concluded that the word "federal"
must be read into regulations that ambiguously refer to "statutes" or "ap-
plicable laws." 132
Finally, the Schott Advisory Opinion133 and section 556.9(f)134 contain ex-
press language of pre-emption, but the weight of their authority is not great.
Courts rarely respect clear expressions of agency intent to supersede or
preserve state laws. 135 An agency opinion is not decisive; its weight turns
on the circumstances surrounding promulgation. 136 Courts may give less
123. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3 (1981).
124. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286-87 (1976).
125. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U,S. 281 (1979).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
127. For example, the preamble that appeared in the first publication of the
proposed regulation was not the same as that which appeared in the adopted regula-
tion. Compare 41 Fed. Reg. 6,283 (1976) with id. at 18,286.
128. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(a)(1981).
129. SchottAdvisoryOp., Res. No. 75-657, at 15 (F.H.L.B.B.July 30, 1975).
130. Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d
471, 477 (Minn. 1981).
131. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(a) (1981).
132. Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 138, 240 N.W.2d
367, 371 (1974).
133. Res. No. 75-657, at 13-14 (F.H.L.B.B. July 30, 1975).
134. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,124 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(f)).
135. Hirsh, Towards a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515,
521.
136. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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weight to opinions issued in response to a particular controversy, as was the
Schott Advisory Opinion. The Board views section 556.9(f) only as a general
statement of policy and, therefore, did not promulgate it according to the
notice and public comment procedures used for the promulgation of
regulations. 137 Thus, the section cannot add much new to the law.
B. Implied Pre-emption
In the absence of express pre-emption, the satisfaction of one of three
tests indicates implied pre-emption. First, does federal law occupy the field
so pervasively that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended pre-
emption of state law? 138 Second, is the federal interest in the field so domi-
nant that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that only federal
law apply? 13 9 Third, do state and federal laws in the field conflict? 40
Pre-emption under the first test requires an intent to enter the field of
regulation, which is evident from the HOLA, and an intent to displace all
state legislation. 141 If federal law occupies only part of the field, state law
outside that limited field is not displaced unless otherwise impermissible. 142
Federal supremacy should not unduly restrict the ability of the courts to pro-
tect important state interests.143 These narrow formulations led one state
court to conclude that the occupation concept was losing ground as a pre-
emption method.144 Proper application of the occupation concept requires
defining the proper field. Different conclusions may result depending on
whether the field is the regulation of the internal affairs of federal associa-
tions or substantive state law.
Courts consistently find regulatory schemes pervasive enough to displace
state attempts to regulate the internal affairs of federal associations, even
when no federal regulation is on point. 45 One court found displacement of
137. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,124 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(D).
138. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978).
139. See, e.g., cases cited notes 161-63 infra.
140. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1976).
141. N.Y. State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
142. Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937).
143. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117,
139-40 (1973).
144. Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or.
542, 577 P.2d 477, 484, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978).
145. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 612 (2d Cir.
1967) (by implication); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405
F. Supp. 819,823 (N.D. Ill. 1975); City First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley,
393 F. Supp. 644, 654-55 (E.D. Wisc. 1975); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 17-18 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Kaski v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 139, 240 N.W.2d 367, 370 (1976). For cases
in which a court properly found pre-emption based on a direct conflict between state
law and a federal regulation on point, see First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Green-
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state law and then implied a federal right to inspect an association's
shareholder list from a regulation allowing members to vote by proxy.146
Another court held a HOLA provision 147 broad enough to displace state
restrictions on branch banking, even though the federal regulations at that
time did not mention branch banking.148
The Board has tried to read the "internal affairs" concept broadly
enough to find implied pre-emption in the due-on-sale clause cases. In the
SchottAdvisory Opinion,149 the Board made the following argument. First, all
borrowers are either members or potential members of the associations. 150
Second, membership can give a borrower voting rights. 151 Third, uniform
bylaws prescribed by the Board allow associations to reject applications for
membership. 152 Therefore, the Board concludes, the right of a purchaser
to become a member of an association by assuming a loan is an internal af-
fair of the association, which is governed exclusively by federal law. 153 This
argument breaks down when the party assuming the loan is already a
member of the association. The logical consequences of this argument also
show its weakness. If the due-on-sale clause issue is an internal matter, all
disputes would have to be handled through internal procedures1 54 before
resort to the courts.1 55 The Board's chief function, however, as an ad-
ministrative body is oversight, not dispute resolution. Also, including the
due-on-sale clause issue within the internal affairs concept extends the con-
cept beyond its traditional bounds of government of the relations among
directors, officers, members, and associations.156
wald, 591 F.2d 417, 423 n.8 (1st Cir. 1979); Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns
v. Stein ("Conference I"), 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'dmem., 445
U.S. 921 (1980).
146. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 611-12 (2d
Cir. 1967).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
148. Lyons Sav. &Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp.
11, 17-18 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
149. Res. No. 75-647, at 18 (F.H.L.B.B. July 30, 1975).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
151. Id.
152. Schott Advisory Op., Res. No. 75-647, at 18 (F.H.L.B.B.July 30, 1975).
153. Id.
154. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980); 12 C.F.R. § 508.13 (1981).
155. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450,
453-54 (1923); Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 366 (9th Cir.
1952); California v. Coast Fed Sav. &LoanAss'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 317 (S.D. Cal.
1951).
156. See, e.g., Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d
Cir. 1966); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. Ill. 1975); City Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F.
Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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Cases holding that all regulation of loan practices directly affects the in-
ternal affairs of associations can be distinguished. 157 First, most due-on-sale
clause restrictions are substantive, not regulatory. Second, these cases state
that federal associations are by law instrumentalities of the federal govern-
ment. If this were true, the federal question jurisdiction debate probably
would not exist 15 8-Congress would not have made jurisdiction based on
the federal status of the association so difficult to achieve. 159 Even if the
associations were federal instrumentalities, substantive state law would apply
unless it prevented the associations from discharging duties owed directly
to the federal government.1 60
The occupation of the field doctrine should not be applied so loosely to
the HOLA that it confuses the Board's plenary authority to regulate and
control federal associations, which no one questions, with congressional intent
to supplant every state law of real property and mortgages, areas of funda-
mental and traditional state concern.
Under the second implied pre-emption test, state law is pre-empted in
fields in which the federal interest is so dominant that it is reasonable to con-
clude that Congress intended that only federal law apply. For example, the
Court has found implied pre-emption of state laws concerning sedition,16 1
local restrictions on noise pollution from aircraft, 162 and state interference
with Indian affairs.1 63
Congress has a strong interest in the maintenance of the savings and
loan system it has created. Its principal interests today are the economic health
of the associations and the efficient functioning of the secondary market
system. The furtherance of these interests promotes home ownership on a
national scale and reduces the risks underwritten by the FSLIC. Savings
and loan associations face recurring economic problems of disintermedia-
tion and profit squeezes. Congress' attempts to attract deposits to savings
and loan associations by fixing the interest rates banks and associations could
pay were not successful. When interest rates paid by other institutions ex-
ceeded the federal ceiling, disintermediation occurred. Profit squeezes occur
when associations must borrow funds at short-term interest rates higher than
the rates the associations charge on their loans.
157. See, e.g., Kaski v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 139-40,
240 N.W.2d 367, 373 (1974).
158. See Gibson v. First Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner of Revenue, 259
N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. 1977).
159. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1976).
160. McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 356-57, 359 (1896).
161. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956).
162. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39
(1973).
163. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 152 (1980).
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In the past, these problems have strongly supported the need for uniform
federal due-on-sale clause policy to infuse new money into thrift institutions.
Recent events, as well as Board policy, however, reduce the need for uni-
formity. Thrift institutions now can compete in the marketplace to attract
money. Savings institutions can offer higher interest rates for passbook and
retirement accounts and all savers' certificates. Profit squeezes also can be
checked without the use of due-on-sale clauses as interest escalators. The
Board now authorizes a variety of alternative mortgage instruments, in-
cluding graduated payment, variable rate, reverse annuity, and renegotiable
rate mortgages. 164 Some of these instruments allow for as much as a five per-
cent overall rate change during the term of the loan. As use of these in-
struments increases, due-on-sale clause enforcement will diminish, along
with the problems attending their interpretation and validity. 165 Although
conflicting views over their marketability exist, 166 some suggest that short-
term, high interest rate instruments are advantageous for most buyers. 67
The new instruments are not as attractive to lenders as escalation at will,
but they at least can replace anachronistic fixed rate mortgages in a sound,
congressionally sanctioned manner that provides consumers with new
marketplace choices. As long as associations have other methods of port-
folio adjustment, state restrictions on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses
will not thwart dominant federal interests and objectives. Even under the
restrictions, the interest in security protection remains protected, because
an association can reject an uncreditworthy purchaser or raise the interest
rate as compensation for the increased risk presented by such a purchaser.
The Board's behavior also suggests a reduced need for uniformity of
state laws on enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. First, as state courts recently
have observed, 168 the Board only permits, not requires, inclusion and exer-
cise of the clause. If the Board considered use of the clause critical to the
survival of the system, it would have required inclusion and exercise. In-
stead, the Board prefers to give lenders flexibility.169 Second, the Board limits
use of the clause, 1 70 which also undercuts the argument that uniform use
is necessary to the survival of the system. Third, the Board has dealt with
state laws governing transfers of title and debtor obligations without disrupt-
ing the secondary mortgage market. It has approved fifty uniform mortgage
instruments that, with nonuniform covenants, are required for ready ac-
164. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-4, -4a (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981). See
generally Draper, Alternative Mortgage Instruments, REAL ESTATE REV., Fall 1981, at 32.
165. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 8, 5 5.23, at 307.
166. See Kratovil, supra note 3, at 306.
167. Beers, Shorter Mortgage Terms Are Betterfor Home Buyers, REAL ESTATE REV.,
Fall 1981, at 93.
168. See, e.g., Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308
N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981).
169. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,124 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 556.9()).
170. 12 O.F.R. §§ 545.8-3(g), 556.9(c) (1981).
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ceptance in the secondary market. 171 Thus, the Board concedes the appli-
cability of some substantive state laws and processes. Fourth, section
545.8-3() 172 states that the exercise of the due-on-sale clause is governed
generally by the contract, and uniform covenant 15 of the uniform mortgage
instruments subjects the instruments to the law of the jurisdiction in which
the secured property is located. The Board's approval of the uniform in-
struments, coupled with section 545.8-3(o, is thus somewhat inconsistent
with its position that federal law pre-empts state laws restricting the enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses.
Under the third implied pre-emption test, federal law pre-empts state
law to the extent the two conflict. The Supreme Court has construed "con-
flict" narrowly, even in areas of exclusive federal power, such as
immigration, 1 73 to reconcile both provisions whenever possible. Dual com-
pliance must be a physical impossibility 174 or the state law must be an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the full objectives of Congress. 175 No irreconcilable
conflict exists between state and federal law of due-on-sale clauses, because
the Board does not require inclusion, exercise, or enforcement of the clause.
These decisions are made by the local associations. Mere federal permis-
sion to use the clause does not conflict with state restriction of enforcement
of the clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
Savings and loan associations have sought to bring low-yield investment
portfolios up to current interest rates by the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses. Property, contract, and equity laws of some states limit this use of
due-on-sale clauses. Some of these limitations are very broad, being the pro-
ducts of attempts to protect consumers. Federally chartered associations have
claimed, with some success, immunity from these substantive restrictions
on the basis of federal pre-emption. Two misconceptions exist in the courts
that have found pre-emption. First, the federal courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to decide the pre-emption cases; pre-emption is properly raised only
as a defense in a state court, with review in the state court system and,
171. For example, three of the four deeds of trust in Williams v. First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981), were FNMA/FHLMC uniform deeds
of trust that contained nonuniform notice language required by VA. CODE §
6.1-330.34 (1979). See 651 F.2d at 914-15 nn. 6 & 7. Similarly, the New York
uniform instruments comply with the "plain language" requirements of N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
172. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1981).
173. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
174. Florida Lime &Avocado Growers v. Paul; 373 U.S. 132,146-47 (1963).
175. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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ultimately, in the Supreme Court. 1 76 Second, the courts have erred in their
findings of pre-emption, mistaking federal power to regulate the internal
operations of federal associations for congressional intent to displace substan-
tive state law. Lenders would do better to appeal directly to Congress for
a resolution of the pre-emption issue.
176. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in Fideliy Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta. 50 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1982).
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